Choosing Blackness in Brazil’s Racialized Democracy: The Endogeneity of Race in Salvador and São Paulo

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Racial identity is endogenous and should be considered a dependent variable in many contexts. Relying on quantitative methods, we examine why some Afro-Brazilians in Salvador and São Paulo choose black identities despite prevailing negative stereotypes in Brazilian society. Our first hypothesis, based on a survey conducted in 2008, is that those Afro-Brazilians with darker skin, higher socioeconomic status, greater experiences with discrimination, and who express a sense of black-linked fate are more likely to identify as preto or negro. Relying on a 2006 survey, our second hypothesis is that Afro-Brazilians in São Paulo rather than Salvador with higher socioeconomic status and who express a sense of black-linked fate are more likely to identify as black rather than nonblack. Our study contributes to an understanding of the changing racial dynamics in the United States and calls for greater consideration of racialized experiences and more research focused on collecting data consistently on an individual’s appearance.

Keywords: Afro-Brazilians; political behavior; blackness; racial identification

Brazilian afro-descendants think if they whiten, they will be accepted by society; if they call themselves something that is not black (negro)...[For] a black [person] it is much easier for them to want to be pardo,...you can be cinnamon, light brown, dark brown,... you can be whatever you want because in the imagination of Brazilian blacks, society will accept you in this manner or you will be less discriminated against.

Black woman activist in Salvador, Bahia, personal interview November 2008

For me blackness is a lot about the process of accepting your African ancestry and black (negra) history in this country. Because when you begin to accept your blackness, you begin to say no to the process of denying the black (negro) in Brazil.

—Black woman activist in Salvador, Bahia, personal interview November 2008

Introduction

The black movement activist above proposes that claiming a black identity in Brazil is a political choice. Believing that they can reduce their exposure to discrimination,
some Afro-Brazilians select nonblack classifications. Further, as the activist claims, a black identity emerges from a process that includes embracing one’s African ancestry. While social scientists typically take racial identity as static, given, or immutable, the Brazilian black activist’s perspective suggests that racial identity is fluid, contingent, and ultimately, endogenous.

In a statistical sense, endogeneity means that two variables have a mutually causal relationship to one another, rather than one variable influencing the other in only one direction. For example, in the relationship between candidate preference and political party, the political party an individual is affiliated with may influence candidate preference while, simultaneously, preference for a candidate may influence with which party an individual chooses to affiliate.

If a researcher treats the dependent variable as candidate preference and the independent variable as political party, when an endogenous relationship exists between these variables, it would mean that one’s political party also depends on candidate preference, clouding the status of each variable as dependent or independent. When the endogenous nature of an independent variable and a dependent variable is not taken into account, the coefficient estimates will be biased and inconsistent.

When examining race and variables such as experiencing discrimination and racial group identification, a statistical model that does not consider endogeneity may only take account of one relationship in one direction (i.e., experiencing discrimination depends on whether one identifies as black). However, if identifying as black also depends on whether one has experienced discrimination (and this is not accounted for in a statistical model), the estimated results cannot be interpreted with confidence. For example, racial identification may depend on age when not accounting for endogeneity between racial identification and group identity. However, taking into account this endogenous relationship in a statistical model, age may or may not remain statistically significant. In this article, we argue that, rather than simply thinking about racial identification affecting various phenomena such as voting preference or racial group attachment, we should also consider whether racial group attachment affects how one identifies racially.

Identity Versus Identification and Color Versus Race

Consistent with the thrust of the activists’ comments, we argue that socioeconomic status, exposure to discrimination, and a sense of black-linked fate are positively related to black identification. Indeed, there may be interactive effects; for example, Afro-Brazilians with educational attainment are more likely to face direct competition with whites for more lucrative and prestigious jobs. These types of experiences may make it more likely that these individuals will identify as preto or negro. Geographic context also might affect racial identification patterns. Afro-Brazilians with a higher socioeconomic status in São Paulo (where they are a numerical minority), rather than those in Salvador (where Afro-Brazilians constitute the majority of the population), are more likely to identify as black rather than nonblack.
Examining the factors influencing racial identification is important to social scientists, especially political scientists concerned with the relationship between racial identification, race consciousness, and political behavior. Indeed, racial identification *per se* is not of primary concern as a determinant of political choices. Rather, it is those processes that yield identifications that may affect one’s political choices.

Processes of racial identification are particularly important for understanding political behavior in Brazil. In 2010, Afro-Brazilians constituted 8.5 per cent of the national congress. They continue to be significantly underrepresented as most recent estimates place Afro-Brazilians as 51.1 per cent of the population.\(^1\) Although the Brazilian media routinely reports voting behavior according to racial groups,\(^2\) we believe social scientists and journalists alike should exercise extreme caution before simply treating racial identification as an independent variable. As Lee (2008) shows, individuals may view themselves very differently from how they are classified by others, especially with respect to national racial census categories. When including a variable like race in a regression analysis, there is usually an implicit or explicit assumption that demographic classification is linked closely to group-based identity. Lee warns that scholars have to be careful about employing the term group consciousness.

Our hypothesis is that those Afro-Brazilians with darker skin, higher socioeconomic status, greater experiences with discrimination, and who express a sense of black-linked fate are more likely to identify as *preto* or *negro*, the color or racial categories that denote blackness, rather than select a nonblack identification. Our second hypothesis is that Afro-Brazilians in São Paulo rather than Salvador with higher socioeconomic status and who express a sense of black-linked fate are more likely to identify as black rather than nonblack.

**Racial Identification**

Throughout the article, we do our best to treat racial identity and skin tone separately, although in everyday Brazilian discourse understandings of race and skin shade overlap. We are particularly careful not to take a body-centric approach to identification.\(^3\) We do not assume race is fixed nor biogenetically determined. We also note that racial identification is contextual and varies. Sheriff (2001) finds that people are sometimes racially identified in certain ways as a means to ‘treat’ them better or in a more respectful way. Rather than describe someone’s friend as black, for example, one may refer to the friend as *moreno*. In addition, a person may racially identify differently according to context. In a context where blackness is seen positively, such as in a social scene or event where black culture is valorized, one may identify as such. However, in another context, the same person might identify as *moreno*. Thus, race is not fixed, and we are concerned with the factors influencing racial identification, especially with respect to Afro-Brazilians who choose the racial category black (*negro*) and the color category black (*preto*). Color categories of this type have a resonance that corresponds clearly with race classification.

In our analyses, we rely on respondents’ self-reported racial identification in answer to an open-ended question, asking ‘What is your color?’\(^4\) Since the question was
open-ended, the respondents were not given choices nor a list of options. Instead, respondents could designate the identification they preferred spontaneously. We prefer the term identification since it denotes the procedural nature of identity formation instead of stasis or an essentialized notion of identity. Subsequently in the survey, respondents also were asked to identify in a census category, which was limited to the options white (branco), brown (pardo), black (preto), yellow (amarelo; which denotes Asian ancestry), or indigenous. In this study, we analyze only respondents’ self-identification. In future work, we expect to undertake an analysis of the relationship between the responses to each type of question.

In addition, we use the term racial identification rather than color identification, as color categories are racialized in Brazil – color is more commonly used as a descriptor than the term race (Caldwell 2007, 36; Telles 2004, 22). However, the term ‘race’ is sometimes used among black movement activists to refer to the raça negra or the black race, and it is commonly used in the nation’s mainstream media. However, Brazil’s racial discourse is generally consistent with that of other former slaveholding countries. The racial hierarchy in Brazil generally idealizes those with lighter skin and denigrates those with darker skin (Caldwell 2007, 51; Twine 1998, 91). For much of its history, Brazil touted itself as a racial democracy where racism was incompatible with its mixed-race population, and the fundamental inequalities of Brazilian society could be fully understood via class analysis. Nevertheless, racism and negative stereotypes against darker skinned and African descendant Brazilians continue to persist. Expressions such as ‘cleaning one’s belly’ or ‘improving the race,’ presumably by mixing African blood and white blood through racial intermarriage, are embedded in everyday discourse (Sheriff 2001, 142).

Choosing Blackness

Previous research suggests that younger Afro-Brazilians are more likely to choose the negro category than older Afro-Brazilians. People with higher levels of education are more likely to choose the negro category than the moreno category (Bailey and Telles 2006, 86). Bailey and Telles (2006) claim that for younger people, negro is associated with a modern identity influenced by black American culture and music. They propose that more educated Afro-Brazilians claiming the negro identity are more likely to have been exposed to black activists rhetoric that promotes a collective black identity than less-educated Afro-Brazilians.

Telles (2004) finds that less-educated Brazilians are two and a half times more likely to choose moreno, a more ambiguous category, while the highly educated are nearly three times as likely to choose the negro category (Telles 2004, 98–99). As Telles notes, in this case, ‘money’ (or education, as a proxy for class) darkens. The impact of education on self-classification as black is extremely important, given the high degree of stigmatization of blackness in Brazilian society.

Furthermore, studies on university-based affirmative action show that some students customarily identify as white, but to apply for an affirmative action quota seat, they may identify as pardo or negro (Francis and Pianto 2012; Racusen 2012). In this case, they become ‘black’ when it is convenient to do so. In fact, Francis
and Tannuri-Pianto (2012) demonstrate that some students at the University of Brasília changed their racial identification or even misrepresented their race after the implementation of affirmative action. Affirmative action can make self-identification with the stigmatized category an instrumental decision. However, in our study, nothing was at stake for respondents in choosing their racial/color classification.

**Discrimination in Brazil**

There are persistent inequalities between Brazilians across color lines. Statistical comparisons show that in 2005, infant mortality was higher for blacks and browns than whites: 24.4 per cent for pretas and pardas and 23.7 per cent for brancas (Paixão and Carvano 2008, 38). In addition, in 2006, the number of whites attending the university was over four times the number of blacks and browns (Paixão and Carvano 2008, 81). Daily experiences of racism, including police brutality against Afro-Brazilians (see Mitchell and Wood 1999), might make Afro-Brazilians keenly aware of their racialized identities, regardless of socioeconomic status.

As past studies have shown, it appears there is a comparatively elite profile of discrimination against Afro-Brazilians. Those with higher incomes and more prestigious jobs face barriers, despite having equivalent or superior credentials to their non-Afro-Brazilian peers. A study conducted by Arias, Yamada, and Tejerina (2004) reveals that the largest discriminatory wage penalties for Afro-Brazilians exist in the highest paid occupations. Furthermore, Paixão and Carvano (2008) show that pretos and pardos who have finished college are 1.2 times more likely to be unemployed compared to whites with the same schooling. Silva and Reis (2011) examine the elite profile of discrimination focusing on black professionals in prestigious positions, for example, engineers, lawyers, and doctors, in Rio de Janeiro. Such professionals work in white-dominated environments where they are a distinct minority. The workplace and the public sphere are where respondents designated the most common sites of discrimination. Silva and Reis find that respondents acknowledged prejudice against them in public interactions with people who do not know them, such as being mistaken for a nurse when one is a doctor. They were less apt to acknowledge discrimination in the private realm.

Citing Soares (2000) research, Silva and Reis note that the more blacks advance, the more they are discriminated against; thus discrimination against blacks is stronger among those with higher incomes (Silva and Reis 2011, 6). Our study examines the link between one’s self-reported exposure to racial discrimination and their racial identification.

**Beyond the Black–White Paradigm: Racial Identification in the United States**

Our study encourages scholars of American racial politics to consider race as a dependent variable. Many scholars have argued that race is a social construct, and some have challenged the use of racial or ethnic identity as a legitimate variable in research (Abdelal et al. 2006). Although Brazil and other Latin American countries frequently continue to be viewed as exemplars where race apparently is fluid and
ambiguous, scholars studying racial dynamics in the United States are also recognizing that racial identity is not as straightforward as originally thought.

Granted, we acknowledge differences in racial histories between the United States and Brazil. In Brazil, the myth of racial democracy – or the idea that Brazil was free of racism because of a mixed-raced citizenry – has been prevalent. Throughout much of Brazil’s history, the simple presence of racially mixed people was used by political elites to promote the idea of racial harmony, despite the underlying notion that miscegenation would rid society of blacks (Marx 1998). In the United States, in contrast, the institutionalization of Jim Crow was meant to prevent relationships between blacks and whites. While the US initially supported blacks (although ineffectively) following abolition with reconstruction efforts such as the Freedmen’s Bureau, the Brazilian government never institutionalized such programs. Moreover, because of Brazil’s close proximity to the continent of Africa, high numbers of Africans were imported, where in the United States replacing enslaved people was too expensive. However, what is important to note is that despite differences in the system of slavery, and the ways in which both histories were later misinterpreted (Marx 1998), both share a history of slavery, racial intolerance, and negative treatment of peoples of African descent. Today African descendants in both countries suffer from discrimination, polite brutality, employment discrimination, and access to quality healthcare.

Though US scholars long have acknowledged the complex nature of race, it is only within the past two decades that the study of racial politics in political science has gone beyond the black–white paradigm (Barreto, Villarreal, and Woods 2005; DeSipio 1996; Wong, Lien, and Conway 2005). Sociologist Eduardo Bonilla-Silva (2006) has suggested that the United States will become more ‘Latin Americanized,’ meaning that a hierarchy of colors will determine one’s fate in life, rather than simply being categorized as being black or white. Even with respect to African-Americans, it is a misrepresentation of their lived experiences to employ a black–white dichotomy without acknowledging that some people identify differently according to context, particularly among those who see themselves as bi-racial (Khanna and Johnson 2010). Furthermore, scholars have noted intraracial differences in political behavior between Latinos who identify as black and those who self-identify as white (Affigne 2006).

Golash-Boza and Darity (2008) find evidence that Latinos have a preference for whiteness, generally wanting to identify as white rather than black. They test three hypotheses, treating race as a dependent variables, with mixed results. Where it was possible to control for skin shade, respondents with higher incomes showed to be no more likely to self-report their race as white than those with lower incomes. The authors point out that lighter skinned Latinos also tend to have higher earnings than those with darker skin; therefore, it is difficult to determine whether there is a conventional whitening effect in the second sample. They also find that Latinos who display greater assimilation – either linguistically or through intermarriage – were not more likely to identify as white. Finally, darker skinned Latinos and Latinos with more self-reported exposure to discrimination were more likely to claim a black racial identity.

In Golash-Boza and Darity’s findings, nearly one-third of Latinos with darker skin self-identified as white. More recent scholarship by Frank, Akresh, and Lu (2010) find
that darker skinned Latinos in the United States do in fact experience wage discrimination, evidenced by skin color penalties on earnings. They also find that Latinos with a higher socioeconomic status are less likely to identify as white and that those who have assimilated economically or have been in the United States longer (such as Dominicans) are less likely to identify with any pre-existing racial categorization such as Latino. The authors conclude that these Latinos are engaging in boundary change and are creating new racial categorizations.

A notable difference between these studies and the current one is that this study focuses on Brazil and only includes individuals preselected as Afro-descendants and who identify as such. The US study consists of all Latinos, not simply Afro-Latinos. Regardless, Golash-Boza and Darity (2008) demonstrate the underlying notion that choice is a factor in racial identification in the United States.

Hypotheses and Methods

We argue that socioeconomic status, exposure to discrimination, and a sense of black-linked fate are positively related to black identification. We test two hypotheses where racial identification is the dependent variable. The first hypothesis is that Afro-Brazilians with darker skin, higher socioeconomic status measured by income and education, more exposure to racial discrimination, and a stronger sense of black-linked fate are more likely to identify as negro or preto, rather than select a non-negro or non-preto identification. The second hypothesis is that these distinctions will have a larger effect for Afro-Brazilians in São Paulo than those in Salvador, where those with a high socioeconomic status and a sense of black-linked fate are more likely to identify as black rather than nonblack.

To test the first hypothesis, we use an original survey conducted in 2008 of 200 Afro-Brazilians interviewed in Salvador and São Paulo, Brazil. It includes interviewer reports on the respondents’ skin tone, measures of black-linked fate, and self-reported experiences of discrimination. To test the second hypothesis, we rely on a larger survey conducted in 2006 of 674 Afro-Brazilian interviewees in Salvador and São Paulo. While it includes a question on black-linked fate, it does not include data on individual experiences of racism nor skin tone. In addition, we include quotes from preliminary in-depth interviews in 2008 and 2012 to highlight our findings. These quotes are not meant to draw conclusions, but to demonstrate our findings in a qualitative context. This allows credibility and validation of our findings as found in responses of Afro-Brazilian respondents.

Theory of Racial Identification

Our hypotheses rely on a theory of racial identification. Since certain racial ideologies are propagated by political and economic elites in Brazil that maintain a system of white domination over Afro-Brazilians, it is useful to think of racial identification within a frame of racial hierarchy. Hanchard’s (1994) idea of racial hegemony is noteworthy, suggesting that the idea of racial democracy is a pervasive ideology that encompasses all, even Afro-Brazilians. However, describing individuals as operating
under hegemonic power may presume that Afro-Brazilians are thoroughly complicit with ideologies of race that perpetuate their subordination. Simply viewing individuals in this manner ignores individual agency. We argue that one way in which individuals demonstrate agency is in the process of racial identification. The most interesting case is when individuals choose black identifications in a society where blackness is devalued widely.

While skin tone can play a role in racial identification, we emphasize the importance of life experiences as potential key determinants of whether one identifies as negro or preto. Our theory of black racial identification is that individuals self-identifying as black have undergone a process in which they begin to embrace blackness and identify as such – despite the low status assigned to blacks in the Brazilian racial hierarchy. In fact these individuals de facto are challenging this longstanding racial hierarchy by virtue of their identification as negro or preto. We suggest that they are engaged in resistance by embracing the stigmatized identity. Their personal process of racial identification may be influenced by their perceived encounters with racism, their educational experiences, which may bring them into contact with black movement ideas and rhetoric even if they are not directly involved in black movement activities, and their sense of connectedness or attachment to other blacks. This attachment is measured as ‘black-linked fate.’

However, our model of racial identification leaves us with a serious conceptual and statistical problem, a simultaneity problem associated with potential reverse causation. Just as an individual’s exposure to discrimination or their sense of black-linked fate may lead him or her to have a stronger black identity, individuals with a stronger black identity may be more likely to perceive and report experiences with discrimination or express a stronger sense of black-linked fate. We will utilize an instrumental variables correction procedure to account for bias produced by the potential reverse causation effects embedded in our model. When we ran simple correlations between respondents’ self-identification and interviewers’ self-identification, we find no strong correlations or patterns in responses. Therefore, we have no reason to believe that the interviewees’ responses were sensitive to the interviewers’ characteristics in this study.

Definition of Terms

The categories of racial identification employed by respondents in the surveys we use are negro, preto, white (branco), mixed-race (mulato, mestiço), moreno (moreno, light moreno, dark moreno), pardo, and marrom. Negro is a politically charged racial category employed by some respondents. There is a long history of black movement activists using the racial term negro and even campaigning for the use of the term in the Brazilian Census (Nobles 2000). Mainstream media employs the term negro to indicate those identifying as preto and pardo in the census. In everyday life, the term negro indicates the black race (Sheriff 2001). The census color category preto also means black but heavily relies on one’s skin color, although as previously noted, social status can be implicated in the term.7 Throughout the article, we use the Portuguese terms for negro and preto to make these distinctions.
Negro Versus Preto

John Burdick (1998) finds that pretos are not as aware of black movement organizations as negros. In Burdick’s sample, he refers to negros as negros assumidos or assumed blacks because these are Afro-descendants who may not have always claimed a black identity, but after reaching awareness of the impact of their race or color, they claim a negro identity. Sheriff (2001) finds that negros assumidos take on this identity after personal experiences of racial discrimination. Nevertheless, in Burdick’s research, pretos are more likely to recall experiences of color prejudice than Afro-Brazilians claiming other color categories. Preto informants believe that negros join black organizations because they are in search of their black identity, whereas pretos do not join such organizations because they are already sure of their blackness.

We do not believe that there is compelling evidence to suggest that pretos are less aware of black organizations than negros. Yet we do believe the two groups are not identical in their political behavior. Mitchell (2010) shows that Afro-Brazilians who identify as negro or preto are more likely than Afro-Brazilians identifying otherwise to vote for politicians they see as negro. However, pretos vote for black candidates in the highest proportions (Mitchell 2010).

Moreno Versus Pardo

Moreno is an ambiguous term denoting persons ranging from someone with light skin and brunette hair to someone with dark skin (Telles 2004). Practically any Brazilian can identify as moreno. In our analysis, when referring to morenos, we include the self-identifying terms moreno, moreno claro (light moreno), and moreno escuro (dark moreno). In our analysis, most respondents choosing the term moreno used it without an adjective or modifier. We also note that terms such as mulato or mestiço may have different meanings and may be used more commonly in some regions than others in Brazil.

Pardo also denotes ambiguity as it signals someone of mixed-race ancestry. We separate it from the category moreno since pardo is included as an official Brazilian census category. Finally, marrom translates as the color brown. Throughout the article, we use the English words for white (branco), mixed-race (mulato, mestiço), and brown (marrom). To emphasize the distinctiveness of the other categories, we use the Portuguese words negro, preto, moreno, and pardo.

Black-Linked Fate

We borrow the term black-linked fate from Dawson’s (1994) notion of black group attachment among African-Americans. Dawson’s notion of black-linked fate and his concept of the black utility heuristic were developed in the context of the specific historical experience of African-Americans. Dawson argued that black Americans share a racial group attachment because of a common legacy of racial discrimination and social exclusion in the United States. Dawson argued, further, that
African-Americans would support policies that will benefit blacks as a group, regardless of their personal class position (Dawson 1994). However, his analysis did not examine how such shared group attachment might vary with personal experience nor did it address skin shade effects. As we observed in the Brazilian case based on the data from these two surveys, not all Afro-Brazilians report that they have experienced racism. In the American context, black-linked fate is utilized to examine support for policies that ostensibly will be beneficial to blacks.

The central question raised by Dawson is whether class divisions have led to differences in perspectives about public policy. He suggests that they have not, since middle class blacks continue to support public spending for programs to help the poor, even when they do not necessarily benefit from such programs.

In the Brazilian case, we do not simply examine whether Afro-Brazilians share a common sense of black-linked fate. Instead, because we treat racial identification as a dependent variable, we ask whether one’s sense of black-linked fate or negro racial group attachment affects whether the individual identifies as negro or preto. Identity and linked fate are not merely semantic but are distinct concepts. Identifying as black is different than feeling attached to blacks as a racial group. In other words, an individual can identify as black but not feel a connection or think they belong to a larger community of blacks. For this reason, black-linked fate is an independent variable and is not simply a linguistic variation of identification. Conceptually, group attachment is not the same as identification. This differs from the American context, where, for better or worse, racial identification is rarely interrogated and scholars of black politics generally presume universal racial identification on the part of African-Americans and that everyone has a similar history of discrimination. In Brazil, while Afro-Brazilian movement activists would be quick to point out historical exclusion based on color, one cannot assume that most Afro-Brazilians would highlight historical racial exclusion as a shared experience.

Skin Tone

Throughout the article, physical skin color is identified on a color palette interviewers memorized and referred to as skin tone. Using the skin shade scale from the New Immigrant Survey available from Princeton University, interviewers chose the respondents’ skin shade accordingly. Skin tones are assigned on a scale of zero to ten with zero designated for albinism and ten being the darkest.

This study is novel insofar as it examines racial identification by considering both socially defined identification and respondents’ physical skin tone. Studies to date, such as the 2002 Pesquisa Social Brasileira (PESB) or the Brazilian Social Survey, ask respondents to identify the color of various people in photographs, where clothing and labels of profession were varied to determine how respondents identified them (Almeida 2007). However, data on the actual skin tone of respondents was not collected.

Stephanie Cassilde (2008) conducted a nonrandom survey in two industrial firms in São Paulo, Brazil, examining the endogeneity of skin color, which in our article constitutes racial identification. She finds that skin tone greatly influences the racial
identification of respondents, that older respondents are more likely to identify as white, and those voting for the Worker’s Party are more likely to identify as black or brown rather than white. Her study is limited to the personnel in these two firms, and although it includes a variable for skin tone, she does not examine an individual’s exposure to discrimination nor their sense of black-linked fate, which, we believe, are required to capture fully the process of racial identification.

Methodology

The surveys were carried out in Salvador and São Paulo, Brazil, in 2006 and 2008. The 2006 survey consisted of 674 respondents, and the 2008 survey consisted of 200 respondents. The two cities were chosen because of their differences in the proportion of Afro-Brazilians and their unique histories with respect to the Afro-Brazilian community. While here we examine these cities in the context of racial identification, we are mainly interested in identifying patterns of racial identification. According to the 2010 census conducted by the Brazilian Institute of Geography (IBGE), Salvador is nearly 80 per cent Afro-Brazilian, while São Paulo is only 23 per cent Afro-Brazilian.

Salvador is located in the northeast of Brazil and is a relatively poorer region. São Paulo is located in the south, a wealthier and more industrialized region of the country. São Paulo is also significant historically because it has been the center of numerous black political movements (Hanchard 1994), while Salvador is recognized worldwide as the epicenter of Afro-Brazilian culture. In addition, the majority of European immigration historically occurred in São Paulo and other southern states in Brazil, where immigrants were subsidized to work and were given preference to jobs over Afro-Brazilians (Andrews 1991). Such blatant discrimination makes racial politics in São Paulo and Salvador very different and likely affects the degree of black activism in each city.

Although Salvador has a history of black movement activism, much of it has centered on cultural recognition, while much of the black movement activity in São Paulo has focused on both culture and social policy that could potentially be beneficial to Afro-Brazilians (Butler 1998). Indeed, Butler acknowledges that even cultural struggles can have policy relevance. In Salvador, during slavery, the differences between people of African descent were related to their groups or regions of origin, the variations in their slave status, and whether they were born in Brazil (Creoles) or in the African continent. With the end of the slave trade, the divisions between Africans and Afro-Brazilians no longer emphasized the African tribes of origin (Butler 1998). Instead, they placed increasing emphasis on skin shade and other phenotypical variations. White elites frequently gave privileges based upon these differences.

In contrast, white European immigrants in São Paulo were given explicit preferential treatment in the form of subsidized travel to Brazil and access to jobs, creating substantial limitations for Afro-Brazilians. Because of ethnic competition between Europeans from various countries and Afro-Brazilians, there was less focus on intragroup differences among Afro-Brazilians. We are not claiming that Salvador only has cultural activism while São Paulo only has political activism, yet we do note the
historic differences that led to an emphasis on culture in Salvador. In addition, in the contemporary context, Salvador is known for its tourism, which is centered on Afro-Brazilian culture. In terms of racial identification, blackness is embraced in São Paulo in a context where minority political rights for blacks have been viewed as rights for a highly racialized group suffering from discrimination. This may result in Afro-Brazilians identifying as such as a means to political rights. This is distinct from Salvador, where blackness is commoditized and, in some cases, based on folkloric notions of Africanness (Pinho 2010), which do not challenge negative hegemonic notions of blackness. However, modern cultural notions of blackness in Salvador – where young people are influenced by clothing and music from Hip Hop in the United States – may challenge such hegemonic notions and lead such young people to embrace blackness in a political sense.

2006 Survey

In the 2006 survey in Salvador, Brazilian undergraduate students conducted a total of 346 interviews in the neighborhoods of Federação, Peri peri, and Itapoân. Experts in survey methods from the Federal University of Bahia (UFBA) chose these three neighborhoods because of their socioeconomic heterogeneity. In addition, these neighborhoods were selected because they are areas where it is known to be relatively easy to find people of African descent.

In São Paulo, selected neighborhoods (Cidade Tiradentes, Casa Verde, Brasilândia, Campo Limpo, and Capão Redondo) were identified by criteria similar to the Salvador sample. The IBGE in São Paulo provided the maps for these neighborhoods. Streets were randomly selected for students to conduct face-to-face interviews. Six interviewers conducted a total of 328 interviews.

In both cities, students were assigned a minimum of two neighborhoods. Interviewers used a skip number method where they conducted interviews at every fifth house or every third house if the street did not contain a large number of houses. Interviewers told potential respondents they were conducting a survey with Afro-descendants. If they knocked on a door and believed the person answering was not of African descent, they asked if anyone of African descent lived in the household. For this reason, an interviewer might have classified a person as white, but if the respondent identified herself as a person of African descent, the interview was conducted. However, there were cases where the interviewer classified the respondent as black or brown but the respondent identified him or herself in another color category. In our analyses, we only consider respondents’ self-identification. The term Afro-descendant was used in this survey, as it is a more open term. Many Brazilians can identify as such – including whites – because of the high percentage of Brazilians with African ancestry. To avoid triggering bias towards a racialized identity, we did not specifically name racial groups or colors. In the Brazilian context, the term Afro-descendant, or asking if someone is of African ancestry, is a matter of ancestry rather than that of identity (Telles 2004). Unlike the United States, in Brazil, Africanness or African heritage is part of the Brazilian national identity and citizens openly accept that most Brazilians have African, indigenous, and Portuguese ancestry. For this
reason, the term Afro-descendant does not trigger racial identity in the way that listing racial identities and asking them to choose a racial identity would.

Because of the study structure, the sample only includes self-identified Afro-descendants. In this article, we use the terms Afro-descendant and Afro-Brazilian interchangeably. Respondents were selected who were of voting age. A total of 674 interviews were conducted in Salvador and São Paulo, and the response rate was 98 per cent across households. The high response rate is because interviewers asked if anyone in the household was willing to be interviewed, rather than simply the person answering the door. We believe the high response rate is because potential respondents could refer the interviewer to someone else in the household if they did not identify as an African descendant themselves.

2008 Survey

The 2008 survey sample consists of 200 respondents in Salvador and São Paulo. Afro-Brazilian university students from UFBA conducted interviews in Salvador, and university graduates trained in interviewing methods conducted interviews in São Paulo. The survey was originally intended as an experiment to measure the effect of political advertisements on racial identification of politicians. Unlike the larger 2006 survey where specific neighborhoods were identified, in 2008, interviewers chose the neighborhoods and in some cases conducted surveys outside of households in public places with people from various neighborhoods.

Data Coding

Racial identification is the dependent variable for both multinomial regression analyses. In the first regression based on 2008 data, the independent variables are skin tone, experience of discrimination, age, black-linked fate, city, gender, income, and education. As we have said, skin tone is measured by a color palette on a 10-point scale and is coded 0 to 1. For interpretation, 1–3 is considered to represent a light skin tone, 4–6 to represent a medium skin tone, and 7–10 a dark skin tone. Experience of discrimination is operationalized with the question, 'have you ever experienced racism?' Age ranges from 16 to 76.

Black-linked fate is measured with the question, 'In general, do you think what happens to negros will affect what happens in your life?' In the 2008 survey, respondents could choose a lot, some, a little, or none. These four options were coded 0 to 1 where a lot is coded as 1, some as 0.66, a little as 0.33, and none as 0. Taeku Lee (2008) cautions linking individual behavior to collective group behavior, which is pertinent to our work since we examine both racial identification and linked fate. For this reason, we do not limit respondents’ choices for racial identification, constrained by a predetermined list of options. Two different measures of black-linked fate were employed to measure the degree of a respondent’s attachment to blacks: one allows respondents to choose one of the four possible answers; the other is limited to a dichotomous ‘yes’ or ‘no.’ Moreover, we emphasize that not all Afro-Brazilians have a sense of linked fate to other Afro-Brazilians, and we examine how
an Afro-Brazilian’s sense of linked fate might affect their sense of racial identity. The possible categories for education are noncompletion of middle school, completed middle school, incomplete high school, completed high school, pre-vestibular status (preparing for the college entrance exam), completed college, or post-baccalaureate degree. Income is measured by self-reported family income. The lowest income bracket is a family income of zero, with less than 3 per cent of respondents in both samples were in this bracket. The next bracket is up to two minimum salaries.\textsuperscript{15} In both samples, most respondents belong to the middle category of between 2 and 5 minimum salaries,\textsuperscript{16} while age is a continuous variable that ranges from 16 to 83. Sixteen per cent of the 2008 sample and 17 per cent of the 2006 sample belong in the 5 to 10 minimum salary category. Less than 3 per cent of respondents from both samples belong to the highest income category of 10 to 20 minimum salaries.

The independent variables for the second regression based on the 2006 data are the same as for the first regression, but they do not include skin color or a variable measuring the experience of discrimination. In the 2006 survey, black-linked fate is operationalized with the question ‘Do you think that what happens to negros affects you?’\textsuperscript{17} Respondents could answer ‘yes’ or ‘no,’ coded as 1 for ‘yes’ and 0 for ‘no.’

\textbf{Multinomial Regression Analysis, 2008}

In reporting our findings, we rely on those findings that are statistically significant. We report two findings: our multinomial regression analyses and our two-stage least squared regression analyses to control for endogeneity. We ran each linear regression separately where racial identification was the dependent variable. In other words, we examine each racial identification variable compared against all other racial identification categories. For example, when running the 2sls regression of racial identification, we are interested in those identifying as white, thus racial identification is a dichotomous variable of white and non-white. We ran seven separate 2sls regressions for racial identification based on the 2006 (\textit{Tables 1–3}) and 2008 data (\textit{Tables 4 and 5}).\textsuperscript{18} We report the findings of our multinomial regression analyses and our regression analyses correcting for endogeneity.

In the first regression, racial identification is the dependent variable and the independent variables are age, gender, income, education, skin tone, black-linked fate, city, and experiencing discrimination. Education, skin tone, and black-linked fate are statistically significant. Based on the 2008 data, we find some support for our first hypothesis that those with darker skin tones are less likely to choose \textit{pardo} over \textit{negro} identification. We also find that those with higher education are less likely to claim \textit{pardo} over \textit{negro} identification and more likely to claim \textit{preto} over \textit{negro} identification. This is a similar finding as Bailey and Telles’s (2006) finding that those who claim black identities tend to have higher education, whereas those with low education choose ambiguous identifications such as \textit{moreno}. Finally, respondents with a higher level of black-linked fate are less likely to identify as \textit{moreno} or \textit{pardo} as opposed to \textit{negro}, yet after controlling for endogeneity, these effects diminish. Although these effects do not remain after controlling for endogeneity, it does not undermine our central argument that the variables in question are in fact endogenous.
Table 1  Multinomial regression odds ratios predicting racial/color identifications as White (W), Mixed-race (MR), Moreno (M), Pardo (PA), Brown (B), or Preto (P) compared to Negro (2008 survey).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>W</td>
<td>MR</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>São Paulo (0)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Or Salvador (1)</td>
<td>(4.55)</td>
<td>(1.02)</td>
<td>(0.59)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>1.09***</td>
<td>0.74*</td>
<td>1.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male (1)</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>3.86</td>
<td>0.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female (0)</td>
<td>(0.64)</td>
<td>(4.68)</td>
<td>(0.44)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
Base outcome is negro.
Table 2  Multinomial regression odds ratios predicting racial/color identifications as White (W), Mixed-race (MR), Moreno (M), Pardo (PA), Brown (B), or Preto (P) compared to Negro (2008 survey).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
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<th>Model 5</th>
<th>Model 6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>W</td>
<td>MR</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>São Paulo</td>
<td>4.44</td>
<td>1.14</td>
<td>.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0)</td>
<td>(5.29)</td>
<td>(1.23)</td>
<td>(.70)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Or Salvador</td>
<td>1.09***</td>
<td>.73</td>
<td>1.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(.04)</td>
<td>(.12)</td>
<td>(.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.69</td>
<td>4.02</td>
<td>.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0)</td>
<td>(.68)</td>
<td>(4.89)</td>
<td>(0.46)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female (0)</td>
<td>1.32</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>(3.01)</td>
<td>(1.05)</td>
<td>(0.14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>3.15</td>
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<td>1.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(.00)</td>
<td>(.01)</td>
<td>(.00)</td>
<td>(.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skin shade</td>
<td>0.00***</td>
<td>0.00*</td>
<td>0.00***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(.00)</td>
<td>(.01)</td>
<td>(.00)</td>
<td>(.01)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.

*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.

Base outcome is negro.
Table 3  Multinomial regression odds ratios predicting racial/color identifications as White (W), Mixed-race (MR), Moreno (M), Pardo (PA), Brown (B), or Preto (P) compared to Negro (2008 survey).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
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<th></th>
<th>Model 8</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>São Paulo (0)</td>
<td>W</td>
<td>0.82</td>
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<td>0.43</td>
<td>0.34**</td>
<td>2.40</td>
<td>1.89</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.31**</td>
<td>4.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Or Salvador (1)</td>
<td>W</td>
<td>1.20</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>4.11</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>1.20</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>(9.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender Male (1)</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.10*</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>1.02</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>1.02</td>
<td>1.10*</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>1.03</td>
<td>1.01</td>
<td>0.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skin shade 0.00**</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.00**</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.00***</td>
<td>0.03***</td>
<td>88.43</td>
<td>3.17</td>
<td>0.00**</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.00***</td>
<td>0.02***</td>
<td>1150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income 0.30</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>1.73</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>1.73</td>
<td>0.00*</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education 0.18</td>
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<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>0.08**</td>
<td>563.16*</td>
<td>9.34**</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>0.11**</td>
<td>10,270.37</td>
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<td>Experienced 0.83</td>
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<td>0.83</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.10*</td>
<td>0.31***</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>1.91</td>
<td>1.19</td>
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<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.47</td>
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</tr>
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<td>0.55</td>
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<td>0.22</td>
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<td>0.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Linked 0.23</td>
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<td>0.23</td>
<td>1.42</td>
<td>0.05** 0.18***</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td>0.05**</td>
<td>0.18***</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.71</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fate 0.52</td>
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<td>0.52</td>
<td>3.17</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.11</td>
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<td>0.58</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
Base outcome is negro.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>São Paulo (0)</td>
<td>W 1.00</td>
<td>M 0.89</td>
<td>P 0.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Or Salvador (1)</td>
<td>0.28***</td>
<td>0.40***</td>
<td>0.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.26)</td>
<td>(0.90)</td>
<td>(0.20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>1.04***</td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male (1)</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td>1.02***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female (0)</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>1.32</td>
<td>2.15***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.20)</td>
<td>(0.30)</td>
<td>(0.53)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
Base outcome is negro.
Table 5  Multinomial regression odds ratios predicting racial/color identifications as White (W), Mixed-race (MR), Moreno (M), Pardo (PA), Brown (B), or Preto (P) compared to Negro (2006 survey).

<table>
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<tr>
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<tbody>
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<td>São Paulo (0)</td>
<td>0.22***</td>
<td>1.38</td>
<td>0.40***</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td>1.07</td>
<td>0.24***</td>
<td>1.20</td>
<td>0.41***</td>
<td>0.91</td>
<td>1.04</td>
<td>1.08</td>
<td>0.26**</td>
<td>1.16</td>
<td>0.45***</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>1.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Or Salvador (1)</td>
<td>(0.12)</td>
<td>(0.88)</td>
<td>(0.09)</td>
<td>(0.21)</td>
<td>(1.10)</td>
<td>(0.28)</td>
<td>(0.13)</td>
<td>(0.78)</td>
<td>(0.10)</td>
<td>(0.22)</td>
<td>(1.54)</td>
<td>(0.29)</td>
<td>(0.14)</td>
<td>(0.76)</td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
<td>(0.23)</td>
<td>(1.85)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>1.05***</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.02**</td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td>1.01</td>
<td>1.04***</td>
<td>1.01</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.02*</td>
<td>0.96</td>
<td>1.01</td>
<td>1.04**</td>
<td>1.01</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>1.01</td>
<td>0.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.23)</td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male (1)</td>
<td>0.91</td>
<td>3.71*</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>1.38</td>
<td>1.26</td>
<td>2.08***</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>3.88**</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>1.37</td>
<td>1.15</td>
<td>2.07***</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>3.95**</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>1.35</td>
<td>1.18</td>
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<tr>
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<td>(2.52)</td>
<td>(0.21)</td>
<td>(0.32)</td>
<td>(1.79)</td>
<td>(0.53)</td>
<td>(0.40)</td>
<td>(2.65)</td>
<td>(0.21)</td>
<td>(0.31)</td>
<td>(1.64)</td>
<td>(0.53)</td>
<td>(0.38)</td>
<td>(2.70)</td>
<td>(0.21)</td>
<td>(0.31)</td>
<td>(1.70)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
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<td>0.83</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.24**</td>
<td>1.75</td>
<td>2.43</td>
<td>1.69</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.34*</td>
<td>0.27**</td>
<td>13.83</td>
<td>2.50</td>
<td>1.42</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.34*</td>
<td>0.27**</td>
<td>15.85</td>
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<td>(1.33)</td>
<td>(1.25)</td>
<td>(0.14)</td>
<td>(0.14)</td>
<td>(6.15)</td>
<td>(1.50)</td>
<td>(1.88)</td>
<td>(2.65)</td>
<td>(0.21)</td>
<td>(0.17)</td>
<td>(54.43)</td>
<td>(1.71)</td>
<td>(1.57)</td>
<td>(0.57)</td>
<td>(0.21)</td>
<td>(1.71)</td>
<td>(63.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
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<td>5.86</td>
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<td>0.78</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>5.86</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>5.86</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.58)</td>
<td>(7.97)</td>
<td>(0.28)</td>
<td>(0.44)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.57)</td>
<td>(0.58)</td>
<td>(7.97)</td>
<td>(0.28)</td>
<td>(0.44)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.57)</td>
<td>(0.58)</td>
<td>(7.97)</td>
<td>(0.28)</td>
<td>(0.44)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Linked Fate</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.  
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.  
Base outcome is negro.
**Education and Racial Identification**

The following quotes are examples responses to a question asking respondents if they identify themselves as black. The description of respondents that accompanies their answers highlights that education plays a role in identification:

> Because of the type of education I have had, I thank the [Steve] Biko [Institute gave me] a political vision of the world...Before my arrival to the Institute I had no idea of the racial discussion. (20-year-old, light skinned, self-identified Negro Male in Salvador, personal interview July 2012)

> Yes [laughing], I joke that if you look at me and see my features, nose, skin color, type of color I do not have anywhere to run to deny what I have. Because I grew up in a white school with this idea of white beauty so you try to straighten your hair...Today I do not think like this...I’ve already passed through all these crises. I affirm myself as a black woman. I don’t have any problem with this. (32-year-old, medium skin tone, self-identified Negra female, who has completed college in Salvador, personal interview, July 2012)

> No. We are all humans. (74-year-old, dark skinned, self-identified moreno man, with an incomplete elementary school education from São Paulo, personal interview August 2012)

Education is also statistically significant. Based on the 2008 data, there is an education effect but not an income effect. Respondents with higher education are 11 per cent less likely to claim *pardo* over *negro* identification at the $p < 0.05$ level. Respondents with higher education versus those with lower education are 1065 per cent more likely to choose *preto* over *negro* identification at the $p < 0.05$ level (Table 3).

Most respondents belong to the incomplete and completed high school category, with 30 per cent of the 2008 sample having less than a high school level of education. Yet, overall the sample is relatively well educated, since 30 per cent of the sample reported at least some college education. Based on the 2008 data, respondents overwhelmingly claim *negro* and *preto* identification when they belong to the highest educational level. At the lowest level of education, the majority of respondents claim non-*preto* and non-*negro* identifications. As educational levels increase, the percentage of respondents claiming *preto* identification also increases.

**Skin Tone and Racial Identification**

Skin tone is also statistically significant. Based on the 2008 data, darker respondents are 2 per cent less likely to claim *pardo* over *negro* identification at the $p < 0.01$ level. Respondents in São Paulo are 31 per cent less likely than respondents in Salvador to claim *pardo* over *negro* identification at the $p < 0.05$ level. Age is not statistically significant. After controlling for endogeneity, these effects disappear.

Based on our 2008 data, we find that dark-skinned and medium-skin toned Afro-Brazilians clearly tended to choose *negro* and *preto* identifications more frequently
than light-skinned Afro-Brazilians. Three per cent of the respondents identified as white, 2 per cent identified as mixed-race, 16 per cent identified as *moreno*, 14 per cent identified as *pardo*, and only 1 per cent identified as brown. Forty-nine per cent of respondents identified as *negro* and 17 per cent identified as *preto*.

As aforementioned, skin shades were assigned on a scale of one to ten. Effectively, lighter skin shades are in the range one to three, medium skin tones are four to six, and darker skin tones are seven to ten. Afro-Brazilians who had lighter or medium skin tones (as determined by the interviewer) selected all the color categories named in the open-ended question except brown, while dark-skinned Afro-Brazilians selected all categories except white (*Table 6*).

Dark-skinned and medium-skin toned Afro-Brazilians clearly tended to choose *negro* and *preto* identifications more frequently than light-skinned Afro-Brazilians. Fifty-seven per cent of dark-skinned Afro-Brazilians identified as *negro*, while 43 per cent of medium-skin tone Afro-Brazilians and 27 per cent of light-skinned Afro-Brazilians identified themselves as *negro*. Twenty per cent of dark-skinned respondents identified as *preto*, while sixteen and 9 per cent of medium and light-skinned respondents respectively, identified as such. For medium and dark-skinned respondents, *negro* was the most popular racial identification. For light-skinned respondents, 27 per cent self-identified as *moreno* and 27 per cent self-identified as *negro*. *Moreno* and *negro* were the most popular racial categories selected by light skinned respondents.

**Black-Linked Fate and Racial Identification**

The two following quotes come from responses to a question about black-linked fate in which respondents were asked if they think what happens to *negros* affects them. In the first quote, the light skinned student who refused to racially identify does not demonstrate black group attachment. Yet in the second quote, the dark skinned student identifies as *negra* and does demonstrate black group attachment:

| Skin shade (from light to dark) and respondent color identification |
|-------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|
|                         | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | Total |
| White                   | 1 | 1 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |  5  |
| Mixed-race              | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |   4  |
| Moreno                  | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |   7  |
| Pardo                   | 3 | 2 | 4 | 5 | 7 | 8 |10 | 8 | 3 | 0 |  50  |
| Brown                   | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |   2  |
| Negro                   | 0 | 2 | 4 | 9 | 9 |12 |21 |24 |14 | 1 |  96  |
| Preto                   | 0 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 4 | 6 | 5 | 8 | 3 | 3 |  33  |
| Total                   | 4 | 5 |13 |21|21|27|40|41|21| 4 | 197  |

*G. Mitchell-Walthour and W. Darity*
...For me, I am not affected... (24-year-old, caramel colored, male college student at the Federal University of Bahia (UFBA), who refused to claim a racial identification, personal interview November 2008)

I think so. I think it is interesting, the feeling of brotherhood that the black (negro) has with one another. I think it is very strong. I don’t know if this happens with whites... (19-year-old, dark-skinned, college student at UFBA, who self-identified negra, personal interview, November 2008)

Although we do not make generalizations based on these preliminary interviews, they do highlight our quantitative findings. Their responses highlight differences between the two participants as they relate to how they self-identify racially.

Black-linked fate is also statistically significant, but experiencing discrimination is not. Based on the 2008 data, respondents with a stronger sense of linked fate are 5 per cent less likely to choose moreno over negro at the $p < 0.05$ level, and are 18 per cent less likely to choose pardo over negro identification at the $p < 0.01$ level. These findings complicate studies on racial identification in Brazil, such as Bailey and Telles’s (2006) work that does not include a variable for black-linked fate. After controlling for endogeneity, these effects disappear. This is an important finding because studies that do not consider endogeneity may conclude that variables such as education or black-linked fate are statistically significant; however, they may not be so if one controls for endogeneity. The significance is that one must acknowledge that race may be endogenous and should not only be considered an independent variable. Scholars of Black and Latino politics should consider the endogeneity of race.

In the 2008 survey, responses to the question ‘In general, do you think what happens to negros will affect you in your life’$^{19}$ were determined to signify the following: choosing ‘a lot’ is viewed as a very strong sense of black-linked fate; choosing some is considered moderate black-linked fate; choosing ‘not a lot’ is considered weak black-linked fate; and choosing ‘no’ is no sense of black-linked fate. Forty-four per cent of respondents expressed a very strong sense of black-linked fate, while 28 per cent expressed a moderate sense of linked fate. Eleven per cent indicated that they had a sense of weak linked fate, while 17 per cent indicated none whatsoever. Of all respondents, 72 per cent reported a very strong or moderate sense of black-linked fate. This percentage may seem extremely high, since political scientists do not consider racial group identity to be salient among Afro-Brazilians in their analyses (Hagopian 1996; Mainwaring, Meneguello, and Power 2000; Von Mettenheim 1986). However, in our sample, it is consistent with the high proportion of respondents who claim a black identity.

Out of those who claimed non-preto and non-negro identifications, 64 per cent of respondents report no sense of black-linked fate, while only 17 per cent of respondents with a strong sense of black-linked fate claimed similar identifications. Differences were also reflected between the two Brazilian cities. In Salvador, only 39 per cent of respondents expressed very strong black-linked fate, while 52 per cent indicated a very strong sense of black-linked fate in São Paulo.
It is important to examine the relationship between black-linked fate and color identification more closely. While half of all respondents that identify as negro believe strongly that what happens to negros affects them, only 10 per cent of negros reported no sense of black-linked fate, with only a mere 6 per cent of pretos reporting the same. These descriptive statistics are useful in illuminating individual variables relationship with identification. However, the logistic regression analysis allows us to examine how experiences with discrimination and sociodemographic variables jointly affect identification.

At the extremes of skin shades, there is a high degree of evidence of strong black-linked fate. All respondents in the darkest skin shade, coded as ten, displayed a very strong sense of black-linked fate. Seventy-five per cent of respondents in the lightest skin shade, coded as one, also displayed the same. Excluding the extremes, darker skin respondents display a very strong sense of black-linked fate, followed by medium and light skin tone respondents: 46 per cent of darker respondents, 43 per cent of medium skin tone respondents, and 42 per cent of lighter skinned respondents displayed a very strong sense of black-linked fate. By comparison, for those that display no sense of black-linked fate, there is only a two-percentage point difference (19 versus 21 per cent).

**Multinomial Regression, 2006**

Our dependent variable is racial identification and our independent variables are black-linked fate, city, income, education, and gender. Based on the 2006 data, income, gender, geography, and black-linked fate were statistically significant (Table 5). Our major findings partially support our second hypothesis. We find that respondents with higher incomes are less likely to claim moreno or pardo identification over negro identification. We also find that respondents with a sense of black-linked fate are less likely to claim a white, moreno, or pardo identification over a negro identification. As mentioned previously, Bailey and Telles (2006) examined socioeconomic status as education and found that those with higher education levels claimed a black identity. We examined income and education, finding that income was statistically significant but education was not. Thus, as education and income both constitute socioeconomic status, we find conflicting evidence insofar as there is an income effect but no education effect. Nor do we find support for our claim that respondents in São Paulo claim a negro or preto identification more often than respondents in Salvador.

**Racial Identification**

In an open-ended question, respondents were prompted to identify their skin color. Relying on the 2006 data, 4 per cent self-identified as white, 2 per cent identified as mixed-race, 21 per cent as moreno, 18 per cent as pardo, 41 per cent as negro and 15 per cent as preto. In both the 2006 and 2008 samples, most respondents racially identify as negro. This outcome represents a significant break with previous patterns, possibly due to the primacy of the sample on Brazilians who acknowledge African
descendant status, and the fact that respondents were not restricted to the selection of official census categories that exclude negro as an option.

**Gender and Racial Identification**

Based on the 2006 survey data, gender was statistically significant. Comparison of men with women revealed that they were 295 per cent more likely to claim mixed-race over negro identification at the $p < 0.05$ level. Fifty-five per cent of those identifying as negro were women and 45 per cent were men. After controlling for endogeneity, men were still more likely to claim mixed-race over negro identification compared to women.

**Geographic Location and Racial Identification**

Racial identification was also significant between the two cities included in the investigation. Respondents in Salvador were less likely to claim mixed-race over negro identification and were 45 per cent less likely to claim moreno over negro identification. The 2006 data revealed that of those claiming negro identification, 42 per cent reside in São Paulo, while 58 per cent reside in Salvador. We also found that of those claiming preto identification, 42 per cent live in São Paulo, while 58 per cent live in Salvador. More specifically, 55 per cent of those self-identifying as pardo live in Salvador, while only 45 per cent live in São Paulo. After controlling for endogeneity, the effect disappears. However, like the finding in the multinomial regression, men were more likely than women to claim mixed-race over negro identification when controlling for endogeneity.

**Income and Racial Identification**

The 2006 survey data revealed that income was statistically significant but education was not. Those with higher incomes were 34 per cent less likely to claim Moreno over negro identification at the $p < 0.10$ level. Those with higher incomes were 27 per cent less likely to claim pardo over negro identification at the $p < 0.05$ level. There is no effect associated with educational attainment in the 2006 data, a result which is different from the 2008 survey and is likely due to the ways in which our samples were collected.

**Black-Linked Fate and Racial Identification**

Based on the 2006 data, black-linked fate is statistically significant. Respondents with a sense of black-linked fate were 26 per cent less likely to claim white over negro identification at the $p < 0.01$ level. A respondent with a sense of black-linked fate was 39 per cent less likely to claim Moreno over negro identification at the $p < 0.01$ level and 43 per cent less likely to claim pardo over negro identification at the $p < 0.01$ level. However, again these effects disappear after controlling for endogeneity (Table 6).

In the 2006 survey, respondents were asked the same question concerning black-linked fate, but responses were constrained to yes or no. Eighty-two per cent of
respondents in both city samples answered yes, suggestive of a high degree of racial solidarity among Afro-Brazilians.

Summary of Findings

Both hypotheses concern the effect of black-linked fate on racial identification. Our first hypothesis is that those Afro-Brazilians with darker skin, higher socioeconomic status, greater experiences with discrimination, and who express a sense of black-linked fate are more likely to identify as preto or negro, the color or racial categories that denote blackness, rather than select a nonblack identification. Our second hypothesis is that in São Paulo, rather than Salvador, Afro-Brazilians with higher socioeconomic status and who express a sense of black-linked fate are more likely to identify as black rather than nonblack. We find that respondents with a sense of black-linked fate are more likely to identify with preto and negro identifications. After controlling for endogeneity, these effects disappear. As discussed previously, literature suggests that police brutality (Mitchell and Wood 1999) and everyday forms of discrimination against pardos and pretos may lead Afro-Brazilian to an awareness of discrimination against blacks. Thus, we expected a relationship between the experience of discrimination and racial identification. We find evidence that self-reported exposure to discrimination reduces racial identification in non-preto and non-negro categories. However, when the black-linked fate variable is added, these effects are no longer relevant.

We obtained mixed results regarding socioeconomic status measured by income and education. Based on the 2008 data, education levels had effects on racial identification. Those with higher levels of educational attainment were more likely to claim preto over negro identification and less likely to claim pardo over negro identification.

In sum, we find that in the first model skin tone, black-linked fate and education has an impact on whether respondents identify as black or nonblack. In the second model, geography, gender, income, and black-linked fate played a role in identification. Our argument is that socioeconomic status, exposure to discrimination, and a sense of black-linked fate positively impact racial identification. Although our results are mixed, the fact remains that race cannot be simply understood as an independent variable that does not depend on a number of other variables. Whether one identifies as black may depend on if they feel attached to blacks as a racial group, which may depend on whether they identify as black. This is an example of endogeneity and researchers of quantitative methods should note this. Basing this work on quantitative methods, and including quotes from preliminary in-depth interviews, highlight the endogenous nature of race. First, we have demonstrated through our findings that some variables do have an endogenous relationship with race and, second, our 2sls regression has revealed that when accounting for endogeneity, the statistical significance of most of these variables disappear.

Based on the 2006 data, respondents with higher incomes are also less likely to claim pardo or moreno over negro identification. Thus, the traditional notion that money whitens – or that once Afro-Brazilians achieve higher education and higher incomes, they choose nonblack identification – is simply inaccurate. Despite the fact
that many of these effects disappear after controlling for endogeneity, they are noteworthy findings. Although we have statistically corrected for endogeneity, what is important is that we have also noted the endogenous nature of racial identification.

**Conclusion: Rethinking Political Behavior Using Brazil and the United States as Comparative Cases**

While our work is relevant for the study of race and politics in Brazil, we believe our work on the endogeneity of race also is beneficial for studies of Black and Latino politics in the United States for several reasons. First, our study includes a skin shade variable, and, although skin shade has been included in some studies on Black politics (Hochschild and Weaver 2007; Hughes and Hertel 1990) and Latino politics (Stokes-Brown 2006, 2009), it is a variable that typically is overlooked. As discussed in the literature review, Bailey and Telles (2006) find that as education increases, the likelihood of identifying as black increases. We find the same finding based on one dataset and based on another, as income increases the likelihood of identifying as black increases. When examining race as an independent variable, analyses typically fail to consider the complexity of this single variable. Scholars of American racial politics should consider the role of education and other factors such as linked fate on identity, so that race is interrogated rather than assuming as a static variable. Second, while there are a number of studies assessing the role of black-linked fate in supporting racial policies (Dawson 1994; Dawson and Popoff 2004; Gay and Tate 1998; Tate 1994; Simien 2005), the role of black-linked fate on racial identification has not been a focus of these studies. Third, there are few studies where the racial identification of Afro-descendants is the sole focus of the study (Khanna and Johnson 2010; Rockquemore and Arend 2002). Our study can serve as a useful framework for thinking about the relationship between racial identification and Black and Latino politics by pointing towards factors that may influence the formation of racial identities, rather than simply assuming they are given.

Even though the United States is thought of as a country with less ambiguous racial distinctions compared to Latin America, immigration and multiculturalism are changing such notions. Scholars like Reginald (2006) support a convergence hypothesis, arguing that race in Brazil is becoming more like the United States, while the United States is becoming more like Brazil. Thus, it is at this moment of crossroads that Brazil is an important country of study by US scholars investigating race and politics. We find that Afro-Brazilians with darker skin tones are more likely to claim black identifications. In the United States, Frank, Akresh, and Lu (2010) find that Latinos with darker skin are more likely to face wage discrimination, more so than those with lighter skin tones. It is important to consider the role of skin color on racial identification, rather than simply inserting the variable of race in regression analyses of Latinos and other groups when examining political opinions and behavior without considering the endogenous nature of race.

The task for social scientists in both Brazil and the United States is to consider the experiences that people have as racialized beings rather than just presuming racial identification leads to certain political beliefs or behaviors. Taking racial identification
seriously means researchers have to unpack individual meanings of self-classification and analyze the factors that might influence one’s choice of and intensity of racial identification. This article attempts to provide a foundation for future investigations that treat both the selection of racial identity and political outlook on race as interrelated and endogenous.

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Notes


[2] In an article published in Época on 17 July 2002, authored by Gerson Camarotti and Guilherme Evelin, the headline read ‘The Black Vote: Lula has the preference of the electorate of the black (negra) race, with 49 per cent of their votes, according to the Vox Populi survey.’ Jose Toledo authored a blog post on the newspaper, Estadão’s website, a popular newspaper in São Paulo titled ‘The color of the Vote,’ analyzing the 2010 Presidential Election of Dilma Rousseff and José Serra. Toledo predicted that Rousseff had a 15-point advantage over her opponent Serra due to preto and pardo support, whereas Serra’s advantage among whites and Asians was only five points.

[3] Patricia Pinho (2010) examines Afro-blocos in Salvador and Bahia, finding that many of them rely on a body-centric approach to black identity. For example, interviewees cite having ‘natural rhythm’ and wearing costumes that represent Africa as a part of embracing blackness.


[5] According to the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics in 2010, 48 per cent of the population identified as branco, 43 per cent as pardo, 8 per cent as preto, and less than 1 per cent identified as amarelo and indigenous.

[6] Murgia and Saenz (2002) challenge some of Bonilla-Silva’s ideas such as the three-tiered system. They argue that such a system always existed, which included different groups of whites and blacks on the bottom while today it is made up of whites, browns, and blacks.

[7] In 2007, Afro-Brazilians, which include pardos and pretos, outnumbered whites because of an increase in the number of Afro-Brazilians claiming a black (preto) identity (Werneck 2008).

[8] Scholars such as Cathy Cohen (1999) have challenged the notion of the relationship between black-linked fate and policy preferences. Dawson argued that black-linked fate predicted black support for certain policies. Cohen finds that in the African-American community, some members such as black gays are marginalized and that there is little support of black gay issues such as AIDS. In other words, African-Americans support certain racial issues as a group but other cross-cutting issues that affect blacks with multiple identities do not gain popular support. In addition, black gays and lesbians have different racialized experiences, since they are discriminated against by the larger society because of their race and sexuality and are marginalized by the greater African-American community because of their sexuality.

in US labor markets, which is unlike black men with darker skin. Telles’s (2004) work also finds differences in income between African-Americans with lighter and darker skin. Thus, it is not likely that experiences of discrimination are uniform even among African-Americans. The Brazilian case highlights the importance of considering the complexity of race, just as it is important for scholars of American racial politics to consider the varied experiences of African descended immigrants from Latin America, the Caribbean, and Africa as well as US black slave descendants.

[10] We do acknowledge social psychologists such as Robert Sellers, who developed the multidimensional inventory of black identity instrument to measure how strongly African-Americans identify with being black. Ted Cross’s somewhat different measure seeks to do something comparable.

[11] Even with a skin color palette, interviewers were asked to identify the color of various people in magazines. In Salvador, in general, interviewers identified people as colors darker than interviewers in São Paulo. For example, President Barack Obama was identified as a darker skin tone in Salvador than in São Paulo. Respondents were asked about less well-known people in magazines such as people in advertisements and the same trend was true. All interviewers were trained and told to match skin tones as best as possible to those on the skin color palette. Nonetheless, we note these differences. In both cities, 35 per cent of respondents are in the middle range of skin tones from 4 to 6, and in Salvador, 61 per cent of the sample is in the darker skin tone range from 7 to 10. In São Paulo, 45 per cent are in the darker skin tone range.

[12] Our surveys only involve self-identified Afro-descendants. Although most respondents are affiliated with the Worker’s Party, it is unlike Cassilde’s (2008) study, which examines whites, blacks, and browns.

[13] Já teve alguma experiência com o racismo?

[14] Em geral, você acha o que acontece aos negros no Brasil vai afeta o que acontecem em sua vida?

[15] In 2006, the minimum monthly salary was R$350.00 ($175 USD), and in 2008, it was R$415.00 ($207.50 USD).

[16] To generalize the class standing of respondents, we report average monthly family incomes for various occupations. Our statistical analyses concern monthly family income, which combines all incomes of those working in the household. A maid has a monthly family income of 386 reais, a bus driver of 964 reais, an engineer of 5246 reais, and a construction worker 637 reais (see http://www.worldsalaries.org/brazil.shtml). Nonetheless, because of dramatic economic growth in Brazil, salaries for domestic workers have increased as more opportunities are available. In São Paulo in 2011, wages for domestic workers had risen by 8 per cent (see http://www.economist.com/node/21541717_).

[17] Você acredita que o que acontece com os negros afeta você?

[18] Our multinomial regression is not linear so we cannot run a 2sls regression to correct for endogeneity.

[19] Em geral, você acha o que acontece aos negros no Brasil vai afeta o que acontecem em sua vida?

References


